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ABSTRACT
The modern patent system is incapable of policing
extensive faud. This inability to control fraudulent activity has
created a system susceptible to abuse. The current remedies
offered by the courts to counterbalance fraudulent conduct and
trolling have not proved a sufficient disincentive to curb this
behavior. Specifically, the remedies for faud, such as inequitable
conduct, have not proven capable of deterring repetitive abusers.
Civil RICO may be that solution. RICO has been an
avenue pursued as a defense to patent infringement ever since
RICO was extended civilly over legitimate businesses. RICO can
be used as an effective deterrent to repetitive abuse of the patent
system and extortionate litigation schemes that threaten large
segments of industry. RICO has such an effect because of the
scope of its remedies: treble damages, attorney's fees, and
investigation costs. While civil RICO should not apply where the
Patent Office's standard remedies of unenforceability for
inequitable conduct compensate for individual instances of fraud,
civil RICO can be used to limit repeated abuses of the system
where these ordinary penalties do not work.
This paper will address the questions of why RICO deters
patent abuse, where RICO stands with patent law today, what the
standards for applying RICO to patent holders should be, and
what the future holds for RICO and patent law.
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2008; B.S., Tufts University, 2005.
The author would like to thank both Professor John R. Thomas and Elizabeth
Goergen for their generous help and guidance in preparing this article.
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INTRODUCTION
Aggressive patent enforcement suits by patent holding
companies have become commonplace in the modern patent
system. Such holding companies acquire their questionable
patents by abusing the patent office. These "patent trolls" engage
in excessive litigation, assaulting industry after industry and
extorting huge sums of money. The current system's
counterbalances to fraudulent conduct and trolling are not adequate
disincentives to curb this behavior. Patent trolling has become
such a huge issue that Congress and the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) have proposed a series of substantial amendments to
the patent system to alleviate trolling. However, using current law
in new, creative ways may inhibit some troll behavior: when the
behavior becomes extreme enough, systemic enough, and
prolonged enough, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, also known as RICO, may help stymie costly
trolling.
The RICO Act was originally designed to prevent
organized crime. However, the Act's broad reach due to its close
relationship with fraud, mail fraud in particular, have led to a broad
application of its provisions. Successful civil RICO plaintiffs
receive huge awards: treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees,
and investigation costs. The threat of such large damages will
deter ambitious trolls from attempting fraud or extreme influence
on the Patent Office and from engaging in overly litigious
behavior. So far, however, the courts have met civil RICO
challenges with little enthusiasm. Usually, civil RICO patent cases
are dismissed for formalistic reasons. The Federal Circuit has also
limited the conduct that qualifies for civil RICO to post-grant
activity. However, a few key cases have refused to dismiss civil
RICO challenges in the patent context; in particular, the Lemelson
case lays a foundation for how RICO can be used to curb extreme
trolling behavior. Therefore, because of modern systemic abuses
of the patent system and the flexibility of RICO, civil RICO should
be applied more often in patent litigation cases to curb extensive
fraud on the PTO and abuse of the courts.
This paper explains how Civil RICO can reign in extreme
trolling behavior. Part I will discuss why there is a need to extend
RICO into patent law by laying out the modern problem of patent
trolling and discussing the public benefits of applying RICO. Part
II will explore the history of RICO, why RICO is attractive to
claimants, and the elements of a civil RICO claim. Part III will
discuss how RICO and patent law overlap and what limitations
have been imposed by the courts in applying RICO. Part IV will
discuss specifically where RICO can and should be applied in
modern patent law and how civil RICO may disproportionately
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affect brand name pharmaceutical companies. Finally, Part V will
conclude by summarizing the paper and by offering some
normative thoughts on civil RICO and patent law.
1. WHY RICO? TROLLS, LEMELSON, AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
Patent trolling, the modern pejorative term for aggressive
enforcement of patents against alleged infringers by patent holding
companies, has become a major area of concern in patent law.1
Numerous shell companies have been created for the sole purpose,
sometimes even stated in their bylaws, of litigating their patents.
Many of these companies have no assets aside from their patents,
which are commonly acquired through bankruptcy proceedings,
settlement negotiations, and questionable tactics in dealing with
the Patent Office. Most of the patent holding companies use
aggressive litigation techniques, do not innovate, and do not
practice their inventions. Such aggressive enforcement of the
monopolistic rights of a patent raises the cost of manufacturing due
to the cost of litigation, settlement, and extreme licensing fees.2
Raising such costs makes patenting less attractive by encouraging
trade secrets over public disclosure. This patenting cost may be
passed on to consumers and may be a disincentive to innovate.
3
1 See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme Court's eBay Decision Sets
Back Pesky 'Patent Trolls' or American Innovation, Depending upon Which
Side You're On, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51, 51 (defining a patent troll as "the
nefarious term for businesses that produce no products or services and have the
sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they own and winning
infringement lawsuits against others"). The term "patent troll" has been widely
credited to Peter Detkin, a former assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation.
Id. at 53.
The key argument against patent trolls is not that their
assertions are necessarily invalid, but rather that they are in a
position to negotiate licensing fees that are grossly out of
alignment with their contribution to the alleged infringer's
product or service. . . . The aggressive tactics of the bad
patent holders increases the transaction costs for good patent
holders when they wish to signal that their claims of
infringement must be taken seriously.
Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN.
J.L. Sci. & TECH. 1, 9-10 (2007); see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges,
Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix
Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 953 (2004) (discussing the difference between the
burden of infringement suits on monopolists versus competitive markets).
3 See John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85
TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2111-12 & n.3 (2007) (noting the "strong perception that
patents have become a substantial and growing tax on modern economic
activity"); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
2008-2009
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Patent trolling is a modern trend, best exemplified by the
famous tactics of Jerome Lemelson. Lemelson used a technique
known as "submarine patenting" to negotiate licenses and
settlements worth billions of dollars from major corporations.
Submarine patenting begins with filing successive continuation
applications with the PTO based on an original patent application.
The continuations are then used to delay the issuance of a patent,
sometimes by decades. Years later, the patents in question rise
from the depths of the PTO, like a submarine, with claims that
subsume modern technology. The patentee then uses this
submarine patent to threaten litigation and force settlement for
huge sums of money. Lemelson's techniques, which many
consider extortionate and an abuse of the PTO, form the basis of
modern patent trolling.
Lemelson's strategy has inspired many copycats, who seek
to manipulate the PTO and legal system in seemingly extortionate
manners. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that such patent
practice "prejudice[s] the public as a whole." 5 Over the years,
however, patent trolling has not gone away. In fact, modern patent
trolls have built upon Lemelson's manipulation of the patent
process in other creative ways. Even opportunistic patent attorneys
have been caught purchasing large patent portfolios to sue major
industries. 6  Much of the debate over modern patent law has
revolved around how to deal with trolling.
Such abuses of the patent system have received
congressional attention. Recently, Congress considered substantial
amendments to the patent system aimed at curbing patent trolling.
7
Even the Patent Office is pushing through reforms. For example,
the Patent Office seeks to limit Lemelson-style submarine
patenting by effectively limiting the number of continuation
DISCONTENTS 2 (2004) ("[T]he patent system ... is generating waste and
uncertainty that hinders and threatens the innovative process.").
4 See Robert Greene Sterne et al., The 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape for
Electronic Companies, 823 PLI/Pat 293, 309-15 (2005).
5 Symbol Techs., Inc., v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., LP, 429
F.3d 1051, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
6 See William Barrow, Comment, Creating a Viable Alternative: Reforming
Patent Reexamination Procedure for the Small Business and Small Inventor, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 630-31 & n.4 (2007) (noting that NTP, Inc., a patent
holding company founded by a patent attorney would most certainly meet the
definition of patent troll).
7 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform
Act of 2007, S. 1145, 11 0th Cong. (2007).
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applications. 8 Patent abuse and the health of the patent system is a
major concern for Congress and the Patent Office. However, many
such remedies are palliative - addressing the symptoms and
individual methods of patent trolling without focusing on the
reasons for patent trolling. In fact, a few of the proposed reforms
could open new avenues for abuse of process, including the
proposed third-party submissions and post-grant review
procedures. 9 Such drastic revisions to the patent system may be
long overdue. However, any new system only opens the door to
new, creative abuses. Along with the reforms proposed in
Congress, a potential weapon against the modern troll that has
been with us for a long time, though not yet taken seriously by
courts, is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
or RICO.
RICO provides strong disincentives for trolling because the
Act threatens patent trolls who manipulate the patent system with
treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and litigation costs.
10
In fact, the most successful alleged patent troll of all time,
Lemelson, was also a major test case for applying RICO to patent
law.
In 1994, Lemelson was involved in litigation against Wang
Laboratories over image processing systems and related computer
technology. 11  After Lemelson accused Wang Laboratories of
patent infringement, Wang Laboratories alleged Lemelson violated
RICO's civil provisions by using mail and wire fraud unlawfully to
exploit the patent system and to extort millions of dollars through
the systematic threat of legal action.1 2 The court refused to dismiss
Wang Laboratories's RICO counterclaim on a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing. 3 The court found that a pattern of extortion
involving millions of dollars in settlements through a pattern of
8 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,837, 46,841 (Aug. 21,
2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.78(d)(1)), 1.114) (establishing the new
limitation on continuation and requests for continued examination applications).
These new rules have met with hostility. Recently, a district court enjoined the
Patent Office from implementing the new continuation limitations rules, as they
were substantially likely to be contrary to the patent statute grant. See Tafas v.
Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 664-65 (E.D. Va. 2007).
9 See infra Part IV.B.
10 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
11 Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 430, 432 (D. Mass. 1994).
12 Id. at 431; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
13 Lemelson, 874 F. Supp. at 434.
2008-2009
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litigation based on fraudulently obtained patents via the use of the
mail and wire systems met the threshold for summary judgment on
RICO. 14 Even though the case was settled shortly before going to
trial, Lemelson suggests that RICO may be used to control patent
trolls.
Furthermore, RICO helps promote judicial efficiency by
encouraging party joinder in lieu of individual attacks on industry
members. A common tactic by patent trolls is to sue one
manufacturer in an industry and force settlement or litigation.
Then, based on that acquiescence, the troll systematically
approaches other members of the same industry with the same or
similar patents and forces additional settlements. The Lemelson
case could serve as a disincentive to approach patent suits in this
manner because trolls risk having the extortionate pattern of
litigation qualify as a pattern of racketeering activity. The proper
application of RICO to patent trolling will help prevent this sort of
systematic, piecemeal attack on an entire industry.
The costs on the patent system due to trolling continue to
grow. Instead of focusing on palliative remedies, courts should not
overlook pre-existing laws, such as RICO, to help limit trolling.
Extensive fraud on the PTO and abuse of the court systems can be
curbed, and judicial efficiency can be promoted, by reinvigorating
civil RICO in patent litigation. Due to modern abuses of the patent
system and the flexibility of RICO, courts should be more
receptive to RICO in patent litigation cases.
II. WHAT IS RICO?
A. History of RICO
Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act in 1970 as part of Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.15 RICO was designed primarily to
curb organized crime. However, Congress deliberately drew RICO
broadly, mandating "liberal construction" in an effort to prevent
circumvention by organized criminal entities.16 Although the
original bill was a criminal statute, Congress added a civil
enforcement mechanism under RICO similar to those in antitrust. 17
14 id
15 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2006)).
16 § 904(a), 84 Stat. at 947 ("The provisions of this title shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964; see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 490
(1985).
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This civil mechanism has become very alluring to civil plaintiffs
because of the availability of treble damages for injuries caused by
violations of the act, costs of the suit, and reasonable attorney's
fees.
The liberal construction of the broad RICO statute along
with the available civil remedies has caused RICO to take on a life
of its own.18 The growth of civil RICO has been primarily because
of its ready applicability to fraud-based offenses.19 Over the years,
the court has extended RICO to commercial plaintiffs, applying
civil RICO liability to ordinary business fraud, regardless of
whether the enterprise is legitimate or illegitimate.20  This
versatility in applying RICO has led to creative applications by
civil plaintiffs of the civil statute, including in patent law.
B. The Allure of RICO - Flexibility and Mandatory
Damages
The court's broad reading of civil RICO allows very
creative interpretation and application of provisions. Under the
patent regime, accused infringers commonly apply civil RICO by
21alleging the patentee acquired the patent-in-suit through fraud. In
other cases, the patent holder, which could even be a patent troll,
accused the alleged infringer of a civil RICO violation for selling
infringing goods to customers. 22 Either party in a patent suit - the
alleged infringer or the patentee - can argue a civil RICO violation,
making RICO a generally versatile option during patent litigation.
However, civil RICO is best applied as a deterrence against
aggressive patent trolls than against alleged infringers.
The allure of RICO lies beyond flexibility, in its remedies.
RICO calls for the award of treble damages, costs of the suit, and
reasonable attorney's fees. 23  The statute's remedy provision is
18 See Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d
480, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497).
19 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16 (noting that 77% of civil RICO cases filed
involved fraud).
20 Id. at 499-500 (extending civil RICO to commercial plaintiffs in ordinary
business fraud, whether legitimate or illegitimate enterprises).
21 See, e.g., Jennings v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2007).
22 See Johnson Elec., 98 F. Supp. 2d 480 (alleging a civil RICO violation for
failure to disclose to customers the fact that the goods infringed the patent).
However, the court refused to extend the civil RICO doctrine to encompass this
type of fraud, because there is no duty to disclose. Id. at 491-92.
23 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) ("Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
2008-2009
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mandatory: "any person injured . . . shall be awarded. 24
Mandatory treble damages, costs, and attorneys fees dwarf the
normal remedies under the modern patent regime.
Under the patent laws, treble damages are available, but
they are not mandatory.25 Attorney's fees are only available in
exceptional cases.26 This uncertainty has not stopped would-be
plaintiffs from alleging willful infringement, a common ground for
exceptional circumstances and treble damages, in almost every
patent suit. Many attorneys may find a strong incentive to seek
damages under civil RICO because if the RICO claim is
successful, treble damages are mandatory.
Other fraud remedies available under patent law are equally
lackluster in comparison. Inequitable conduct, which is also
commonly pled in patent lawsuits, will render a patent
unenforceable after finding fraud on the PTO. 28 Antitrust liability
can lead to enhanced damages under the almost defunct doctrine of
Walker Process, due to the fraudulent procurement of a patent.29
Under Walker Process, damages are available beyond
unenforceability if the patentee obtained the patent by knowing
and willful misrepresentations of fact to the PTO and after an
evaluation of the antitrust implications of issuing that patent.
30
The claimant must prove all the elements of a Sherman Act
Section 2 case, which include an appraisal of the exclusionary
power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for
the product involved.31 Walker Process claims pose a notoriously
difficult burden, which has greatly diminished the doctrine's value.
24 id.
25 35 U.S.C. § 284.
26 Id. § 285.
27 However, recently, this doctrine has been stepped back to pre-litigation
conduct only. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d. 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
This would seem to make RICO liability, which reaches litigation conduct, even
more attractive.
28 E.g., Mech. Plastic Corp. v. Rawlplug Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1061
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("In order to set up a disincentive for shirking this duty to
disclose, courts have permitted defendants to assert, as a defense to a claim of
patent infringement, that the patent in suit is unenforceable by reason of the
applicant's 'inequitable conduct' in dealings with the PTO.").
29 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965).
30 id.
31 See id. After proving the Sherman Act Section 2 case, the claimant must also
show: (1) a false representation or deliberate omission of a fact material to
patentability; (2) made with the intent to deceive the patent examiner; (3) on
which the examiner justifiably relied in granting the patent; and (4) but for
9
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Therefore, civil RICO is an attractive alternative as
compared to the uncertainty of treble damages under section 285,
the damage-free remedy of inequitable conduct, or the impossible
doctrine of Walker Process damages.
C. Elements of RICO
Even though civil RICO is more attractive than other
remedies, the difficulties in alleging civil RICO limit the benefits.
Under RICO plaintiffs must show (1) conduct 32 (2) of an
enterprise33 (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.34
While each of these elements has specific requirements to be met,
civil RICO plaintiffs find the most problems with establishing the
requisite pattern and activity.
1. Pattern of Activity
A pattern of racketeering activity consists of at least two
predicate acts of racketeering committed within a ten-year
period. 5  However, exactly what consists of a pattern of
racketeering is difficult to define and requires the application of
common sense. 36 The courts use a continuity plus relationship test
for looking for a pattern of racketeering activity. The
which misrepresentation or deliberate omission the patent would not have been
granted. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
32 Conduct liability only extends to those who have "some part in directing [the
enterprise's] affairs." Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993).
Therefore, sometimes conduct does not include outside defendants like lawyers
or accountants. Id. at 184-85 (1993).
33 "'Enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). This is an expansive
definition includes single individuals, law firms, and corporations and their
affiliates. However, some minimal level of organizational structure is needed
between multiple entities to impose liability for an enterprise. See
VanDenBroeck v. Commonpoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d 696, 699-700 (6th Cir.
2000).
34 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) ("It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt."); see also see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
35 § 1961(5); see also Jennings v. Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466 (7th
Cir. 2007).
36 See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1989).
37 E.g., Jennings, 495 F.3d at 472-73.
2008-2009
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relationship test, met by showing multiple "related acts," is usually
not a problem in patent cases.38 Most problems arise in showing
continuity.
The proper continuity requires either close-ended criminal
behavior or open-ended criminal behavior. Close-ended criminal
behavior is conduct that is finished, but endured for "such a
substantial period of time that the duration and repetition carries
with it an implicit threat of continued criminal activity in the
future." 39 Open-ended conduct is a "course of activity which lacks
the duration and repetition to establish continuity ... showing past
conduct which by its nature projects into the future with threat of
repetition., 40 Conduct in the patent sense is usually closed because
the acts of fraud are usually alleged after issuance. 4 1 Either way,
the threat of continued criminal activity depends on the specific
facts of each case.42
2. Racketeering Activity
Racketeering activity is defined by a large list of predicate
acts.43 Included in this long list of predicate acts are mail and wire
fraud, which helped open up many of the creative applications of
RICO to civil defendants.
Mail and wire fraud have similar requirements. Mail and
wire fraud are defined as (1) using the mails or wires (2) for any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
38 The Court defined "related" acts as those "that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."
H.J. Inc, 492 U.S. at 240 (quoting the Dangerous Special Offenders Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
39 Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473 (internal citation omitted).
40 Id.; see H.J Inc., 492 U.S. at 242 (internal citation omitted).
41 See, e.g. Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473 (finding only closed ended behavior in a
civil RICO patent case).
42 H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
43 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006). For example, racketeering activity includes:
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
controlled substances, embezzlement from pension and welfare funds,
obstruction of justice or criminal investigations, tampering with evidence or
witnesses, and trafficking. Id. Most importantly, RICO defines racketeering
activity to include a large number of fraud related offenses: identification and
official document fraud (including passports, naturalization documents, visas,
and permits), mail fraud, wire fraud, financial institution fraud, and fraudulent
sale of securities. RICO also explicitly covers many intellectual property
crimes, such as counterfeiting, trafficking in counterfeit works and various types
of copyright infringement including neighboring rights violations. Id.
11
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by means of false pretenses.44 The Supreme Court in McNally
defined the term "to defraud" as "wronging one in his property
rights by dishonest methods. 45 This includes intangible property
rights as well.46 Furthermore, Congress has expanded the McNally
definition by including a "scheme or artifice to defraud another of
the intangible right of honest services. 47 Therefore, a scheme or
artifice to defraud can be invoked for the purposes of mail or wire
fraud by defrauding either (1) tangible or intangible property rights
or (2) the intangible right of honest services.
III. LIMITATIONS ON APPLYING RICO TO PATENT LAW
Parties alleging RICO in patent litigation have been met
with resistance by the federal judiciary. Civil RICO conceptually
reaches patent infringement by piggy-backing on mail and wire
fraud. However, most civil RICO allegations are thrown out for
formalistic problems: not showing a proper pattern of activity or
failure to meet the predicate act requirement. These problems have
led to a reluctance by courts to apply RICO liberally to patent law.
However, these formalistic problems serve more as guideposts to
the proper application of RICO rather than as a complete bar to its
use.
4 8
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
45 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987); see Semiconductor
Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("The words 'to defraud' commonly refer 'wronging one in his property rights
by dishonest methods or schemes' and 'usually signify the deprivation of
something of value by trick, deceit, chicane, or overreaching."').
46 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1989).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 204 F.3d at 1380
n.5.
48 Other contentious areas include specific pleading and standing. When
pleading any claim of fraud, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
pleading with specificity. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Failure to plead properly can
lead to dismissal. See VanDenBroeck v. Commonpoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d
696, 701-02 (6th Cir. 2000); Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155
F.3d 644, 658-59 (3d Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the injury alleged by the
claimant must be sufficient for proper standing. The claimant must have been
directly injured by the fraudulent activity to have standing. Compare Johnson
Elec. N. Am., Inc., v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 480 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding standing based on claim regarding use of wires to sell infringing
goods to customers because of lost sales), and Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc.,
874 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding that investigation and litigation costs
were direct injury), with N. Trust Co. v. Ralson Purina Co. 1994 WL 605743, at
*5 (N.D. II1. Nov. 3, 1994) (finding no standing for indirect injury when
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A. Civil RICO and Patent Law - Mail Fraud and
Wire Fraud
Creative claimants have alleged civil RICO violations in
numerous suits. While patent infringement alone is not a predicate
act under RICO,4 9 mail and wire fraud are.50 Under these theories,
RICO can be applied liberally to patent law.
51
Much of patent acquisition and enforcement is done
through the mail or wire. Patent applications, affidavits, responses,
interferences, and other filings with the PTO are all done through
the mail and wire service. Specifically, inequitable conduct seems
to meet RICO on its face, like the duty to reveal prior art.
52
However, such filings have been limited to post-grant activity.
53
Theoretically, every mailing, phone call, or electronic
communication could be seen as a separate predicate act of mail
fraud. Furthermore, threatening filing lawsuits, motions, and other
litigation practice is also done via the mail and wire service.54 An
overly litigious patent holder may find himself liable for
investigation costs, litigation costs, and reasonable attorney's fees
as part of a larger scheme to defraud.55 As mail and wire fraud
only require using the mail or wire services in a scheme to defraud,
RICO's broad nature allows both patent holders and alleged
infringers to apply this civil remedy.
Patent holders and alleged infringers are at risk for civil
RICO violation. As an example, filing false applications and
documents with the Patent and Trademark Office, which would
deprive the patentee of his vested patent rights, may qualify as mail
fraud and as a predicate act under RICO.56 Zealous enforcement of
49 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); Johnson Elec., 98 F. Supp. 2d 480 (citing Michod v.
Walker Magnetics Group, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 345,347 (N.D. I1. 1987)).
50 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1961(1).
51 However, lawyers applying RICO too liberally run the risk of violating Rule
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Lawyers have been sanctioned for pressing RICO
claims based on predicate acts not within the statute's definition of 'racketeering
activity' contained in § 1961(1). See Michod, 115 F.R.D. at 347 (RICO claim in
a patent infringement suit was frivolous because patent infringement is not
racketeering activity).
52 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007). Pre-grant inequitable conduct no longer qualifies for
the purposes of civil RICO as a deprivation of property, but may as a
deprivation of honest services. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 204 F.3d at
1380 n.5.
53 See infra Part III.C.
54 Lemelson, 874 F. Supp. at 434.
55 18 U.S.C. § 1264(c); Lemelson, 874 F. Supp. at 434.
56 See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 204 F.3d at 1380 n.5.
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patent rights can also serve as a basis for finding RICO
violations. 57 Alleged infringers are also at risk. As an example,
ambitious patentees have alleged that the act of selling infringing
goods to customers using the mail system may open up liability
under RICO, although a court in a recent case dismissed this
claim. 58 As either side of the litigation is open to attack from
RICO, this broad doctrine can affect patent holders as well as
patent infringers.
B. Limitations on the Pattern of Activity - Length of
Time and Number of Victims
By far, the most common reason for dismissing a RICO
claim is a failure to show the requisite pattern of racketeering
activity. 59  Courts have been reluctant to uphold RICO claims
because of two distinct shortcomings: (1) the length of time of the
activity and (2) the number of victims of the activity.
60
Although a pattern of racketeering activity can be shown by
at least two acts over ten years according to the civil RICO
61statute, courts have routinely found that two acts during that ten
year period is necessary, but generally is insufficient to violate
civil RICO. Most courts find that acts done over a twelve-month
period or less are inadequate. 62 Recently, the court in Jennings
surveyed the time period of a few acts for RICO and concluded
that ten months was too short a window to support continuity for a
pattern of racketeering activity. 63 Such a conclusion stems from a
57 See Lemelson, 874 F. Supp. 430.
58 Johnson Elec. N. Am. Inc. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 480,
491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); see, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, Resurrecting RICO:
Removing Immunity for White Collar Crime, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 291-94
(2004); Amy A. Weems, Note, A New Use for Civil RICO: Employees Attempt
to Combat the Hiring of Illegal Immigrants, 28 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 429, 434
(2004).
60 Another major point of contention is the number of bad acts. Before
Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., a number of district courts dismissed
RICO claims finding that inequitable conduct is itself a single instance of
improper conduct, even when coupled with planned infringement litigation. E.g.
Berkeley Ltd. P'ship v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 1988 WL 156328 (D. Md. Dec.
1, 1988). However, not all courts have agreed with this approach. See
Lemelson, 874 F. Supp. 430.
61 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); see Jennings, 495 F.3d 466.
62 E.g., Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 611 (3d Cir.
1991).
63 Jennings, 495 F.3d at 474-75.
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desire to keep RICO from completely supplanting individual
instances of fraud.64
The continued threat of activity in the future is also
dependent on the number of victims. When the number of victims
is low, courts are equally hesitant to apply RICO even with years
of activity. 65 Courts dismiss RICO when the number of victims is
wanting because the lack of victims suggests no threat of long-term
conduct. 66 At the very least, more than one victim is required to
show a civil RICO violation.67 However, the number of victims
becomes less important when the patentee sues multiple alleged
infringers. 68 By considering the number of victims, courts can
keep civil RICO from completely subsuming ordinary fraud
allegations, like inequitable conduct.
Therefore, a civil RICO allegation in the patent context
must overcome two major hurdles under the pattern requirement:
the length of the activity and the number of victims. By limiting
activity to more than twelve months and more than one victim, the
court keeps civil RICO from subsuming ordinary fraud remedies
and preserves the required continued threat of activity in the future.
C. Limitations on Racketeering Activity - Drawing a
Line Between Pre- and Post-Grant Activity
Racketeering activity, which almost exclusively focuses
around mail and wire fraud in the patent context, may only apply
to inequitable conduct occurring after the patent is granted. In
2000, Judge Michel and the Federal Circuit handed down
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
where the court limited the application of inequitable conduct to
civil RICO claims.
69
Relying on the McNally definition of property, which
relates "to defraud" directly to "property," Judge Michel held "[a]n
application that has not matured into a patent cannot properly be
deemed governmental property." 70 As such, "inequitable conduct
64 E.g., id. at 473 ("The state courts and the PTO itself have ample tools to
correct any individual instances of fraud or other misconduct.").
61 Id. at 475-76. Notably, general allegations of harm to the public have also
failed. Id. (rejecting general claims that the PTO, taxpayers, and incidental
market participants were injured).
66 See, e.g., id. at 476.
67 See, e.g., id.
68 See, e.g., Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1994).
69 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
70 Id. at 1380.
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before the PTO cannot qualify as an act of mail fraud or wire fraud
for purposes of determining the predicate act requirement.
'" 71
However, the court did not completely close the door on
inequitable conduct before the PTO as a predicate act.
The court did not rule on whether the inequitable conduct
before the PTO intended to defraud another of the intangible right
of honest services would meet the predicate act requirement.
72
After Semiconductor, inequitable conduct does not defraud the
government of any property under mail or wire fraud, but it may
still deny the right of intangible honest services.
The right of intangible honest services may seem very
attractive as a predicate act for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
Section 1346 is usually directed at preventing corruption among
public officials, such as through bribery. 73  The trial court in
Semiconductor suggests that to find a deprivation of intangible
right to honest services, the complainant must allege that the
government official performed its duties dishonestly because of the
conduct of the defendant. 74 In fact, most of the case law applying
honest services to public officials involves bribery, 75 kickback
schemes, 76  concealment of conflicts of interest,77  and
71 Id. The court recognized that a patent is, in fact, property after issuance. Id.
Prior to Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., a few courts held that fraud on
the Patent Office was a predicate act of racketeering activity. In Select
Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1992), the
court refused to dismiss a claim of civil RICO because in a patent infringement
case upon a sufficient showing of a pattern of multiple acts of mail and wire
fraud in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Id. at 1359. The predicate acts
included "omissions from the patent application," violating 37 C.F.R. section
1.56(a) and the section's duty of candor and good faith to disclose information
material to the examination of the application. Id. at 1359. More importantly,
the court specifically rejected the argument that the government does not have a
property interest in the patent. Id. at 1361.
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) ("For the purposes of this chapter, the term
"scheme or artifice to defraud" includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another
of the intangible right of honest services.").
73 Section 1346 also applies to private behavior. United States v. Wang, 898 F.
Supp. 758 (D. Colo. 1995). However, that is beyond the scope of this paper.
74 See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d
473, 476 (E.D.Va. 1998) ("Samsung makes no allegations and no evidence
indicates that the PTO provided anything less than honest services or that
[defendant] intended for them to provide dishonest services."); see also United
States v. Mangiardi, 962 F. Supp. 49, 53 (M.D. Pa. 1997) ("[T]his is not the type
of conduct which is proscribed by the mail and wire fraud statutes because the
services of the governmental entity/fiduciary is not rendered dishonest by the
efforts to elude honest enforcement of the law.").
75 See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
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embezzlement of public funds. 78 The intangible right of honest
services, therefore, may be stretched to pre-issuance activity in
extreme cases of influence. However, this extension is probably
limited to methods such as bribery of an examiner.
79
Although the Federal Circuit seemed to slam the door on
pre-issuance inequitable conduct as a predicate act, certain conduct
before the PTO may still invoke a RICO predicate act. The
Semiconductor case seems not to reach all post-issuance filings
such as interference proceedings and Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) Paragraph IV filings with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Most importantly, Semiconductor leaves
extortionate litigation schemes as a viable predicate act under civil
RICO.
IV. RICO APPLIED
Despite the limitations of RICO's application to patent law,
RICO can still be applied to discourage patent trolling. The areas
where RICO still applies, litigation schemes and certain areas of
filing activity, are enough to counteract extensive abuse of the
patent system and enforcement process. Such application, while it
may disproportionately affect certain industries like
pharmaceuticals, can encourage stronger, more reliable patents.
Currently, abusive litigations schemes still serve as a basis for civil
RICO liability.
A. Extortionate Litigation Schemes - Trolls and
Lemelson
Individual acts of mail and wire fraud under pre- or post-
grant activity may still not be enough activity to meet the burden of
civil RICO. Such isolated incidents may still be compensated for
using the traditional avenues such as inequitable conduct.
However, ongoing conduct is not prevented by such normal
remedies for fraud. Here, the best avenue for applying civil RICO
is to include the resulting litigation conduct as part of the scheme
or artifice to defraud, as argued by the plaintiff in Lemelson.
80
77 See, e.g., United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555 (1st Cir. 1996).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Fauver, 888 F. Supp. 668 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
79 Other types of corruption have flowed from § 1346, such as misappropriation
of confidential public information, see, e.g., United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d
961 (4th Cir. 1995). However, merely hindering the honest performance of
public duties is not depriving honest services. Mangiardi, 962 F. Supp. 49.
80 Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D. Mass. 1994).
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Lemelson serves as a guidepost for the proper application
of RICO to vexatious litigation schemes. The court in Lemelson
walked through the requirements of RICO when it refused to
dismiss the civil RICO allegation. The court found sufficient
injury, enterprise, and pattern of racketeering activity to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. First, the court found adequate
injury because Wang Laboratories was forced to undertake an
investigation to determine the validity of the claims and costs of
defending against this litigation scheme. 81 The court then found
proper enterprise through association in fact.82 The court extended
the enterprise to Lemelson, his agents, his attorneys, and controlled
corporate entities as they acted cohesively for the purposes of
coercive patent enforcement using frivolous lawsuits. 83 Finally,
the court found a sufficient pattern of racketeering activity based
on Lemelson's use of litigation and threat of litigation as part of
the scheme to extort settlement monies to survive summary
judgment. 84  The predicate acts alleged were the enterprise's
repeated and continuous use of the United States mail system and
telephone wire to further this extortionate scheme.
85
The application of civil RICO should be limited to extreme
cases, in some combination of fraudulent filings with extortionate
litigation. Many of the civil RICO allegations against individual
patent holders have failed.86  However, the contrast between
Lemelson and the other cases illustrates exactly where civil RICO
should be applied. Unlike the questionable patentee claiming
against one party, civil RICO should be applied to prevent those
who have abused the patent system so far as to hold an entire
industry hostage. Such limited application would keep civil RICO
out of individual, one-time patent disputes. However, industry-
wide litigation is not uncommon.87 Focusing on litigation schemes
81 Id. at 432-33.
82 Id. at 433.
83 id.
84 Id. at 434.
85 id.
86 See supra Part 111.
87 For example, a company known as Acacia Research Corporation, via its
subsidiary, Acacia Media Technologies, has taken on much of the adult and
cable industry regarding streaming video technology. See, e.g., Press Release,
Acacia Research Corp., Acacia Technologies Files Cable and Satellite TV
Patent Infringement Lawsuit (June 15, 2004) (on file with author),
http:/www.acaciatechnologies.com/pr/0615041itigation.pdf; see also John
Borland, Patent Scare Hits Streaming Industry, available at
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-983552.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
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instead of individual fraudulent acts would limit the application to
Lemelson situations where an enterprise has shown a pattern of
racketeering activity by systematically threatening litigation on
patents acquired with qualifying predicate acts. Such systematic
attacks, by definition, have a number of victims, which satisfies the
number of victims limitation on applying civil RICO. By requiring
a showing of extortionate litigation, civil RICO's reach can be
limited to extreme troll behavior and not rudimentary fraud on the
Patent Office.
Limiting civil RICO to extreme cases has doctrinal support.
The Patent Office has many measures for dealing with individual
cases of fraudulent and abusive activity. 88  Fraudulent filings
during prosecution result in unenforceable patents under the
doctrine of inequitable conduct. 89 Attempting to use the patent to
acquire rights beyond its scope can also render a patent temporarily
unenforceable under patent misuse. 90 Treble damages are
available for defendants under Walker-Process violations and other
exceptional cases.91  However, none of these of these actions
punish a repeated abuser any more than an individual instance.
Civil RICO, on the other hand, goes one step further. A civil
RICO claim should be used when the standard deterrents were not
enough to curb the repeated behavior. Such conduct, coupled with
vexatious litigation, should be the basis for alleging civil RICO
claims in patent law.
Therefore, the Lemelson case forms the framework for
applying civil RICO to control patent trolling. To prevent
displacing ordinary fraud, civil RICO needs to be confined to
extreme cases of fraud only, as in Lemelson. However, in those
situations, courts should be more willing to apply RICO. Civil
RICO can be used as a tool to limit repeated abuses of the patent
system because such repetition suggests the ordinary fraud
deterrents are not enough of a disincentive. The possibility of
Acacia is a self proclaimed patent holding company, describing itself as "in the
business of acquiring, developing, licensing and enforcing patents. We help
patent holders protect their patented inventions from unauthorized use and
generate revenue from licensing and, if necessary, enforcing their patents." See
Acacia Technologies Group, http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/
aboutus main.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
88 E.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2007).
89 Id.; Mech. Plastic Corp. v. Rawlplug Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1060-
61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
90 E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
91 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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damages for investigation costs and litigation conduct increase the
attractiveness of this option in seeking treble damages.
B. Fraudulent Filers
Originally, scholarly writing on patent law and RICO
focused solely on pre-grant filings. Most of the attention was
particularly on the susceptibility of fraud during prosecution using
the mails and wire.92 The multitude of filings of papers and fees,
phone calls, pre-grant interferences required when prosecuting a
patent formed the basis of this approach.93 Recent case law has
split the modern application of RICO under mail and wire fraud
into pre- and post-grant filers.
To qualify for a predicate act of mail or wire fraud under
RICO, pre-grant filings must result in a deprivation of honest
services. 94 An appropriate predicate act under RICO would use the
mail or wire service resulting in such a deprivation.
95
Traditionally, honest services deprivations apply to bribery,
kickbacks, and embezzlement involving governmental officials.
96
Merely hindering the honest performance of public duties is not
depriving honest services. 97  However, the underlying policy
reason recognizes that deprivation of honest governmental services
results from exerting such a high level of influence that the
government official performs his duties dishonestly. 98 Aside from
extreme acts such as bribery, Semiconductor has effectively
marked the end of applying RICO to ordinary pre-grant inequitable
conduct.
Since Semiconductor removed pre-grant inequitable
conduct from civil RICO, the most readily applicable traditional
mail and wire fraud violations come from post-grant filings that
deprive an already existing patent holder of his vested property
92 E.g., Kenneth R. Adamo & Robert P. Ducatman, Civil Rico Are Patents
Next?, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 185, 196 (1984) [hereinafter Are Patents Next?];
Steve Fasman, The Proper Application of Civil Rico to Patent Fraud, 96 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1987); see also Kenneth R. Adamo & Robert P. Ducatman, Civil
RICO - The Interface with Intellectual Property, 56 CLEV. B.J. 160 (1985).
93 Are Patents Next?, supra note 92, at 197.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1346; Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
204 F.3d 1368, 1380 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346, 1962(c).
96 See supra Part III.C.
97 United States v. Mangiardi, 962 F. Supp. 49, 53-55 (M.D. Pa. 1997).
98 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 473,
476; see supra Part III.C.
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right.99 Post-grant filings have not yet been tested in the courts.
Therefore, qualifying predicate acts of mail and wire fraud may
still include fraudulent filings during post-grant interferences
00
and ANDA paragraph IV applications.'
01
Post-grant interferences allow a patent challenger to attack
granted patent rights and may form a basis for a predicate act under
civil RICO. Challengers use post-grant interferences to contest
priority. Interferences may be instituted post-grant between an
application and a patent already issued as long as that patent
application has not been issued for more than one year. 0 2 During
an interference proceeding, the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences "shall determine questions of priority of the
inventions and may determine questions of patentability."
0 3
Interferences commonly use the mail or wire systems to make
submissions. Notably, any agreements or understandings settling
interferences must be in writing and filed with the PTO.
10 4
Fraudulent filings on the PTO during a post-grant interference
proceeding could then easily be seen as an attempt to defraud a
patentee of a property right, his patent.1 0 5  Therefore, any
fraudulent filings during a post-grant interference proceeding could
be qualifying predicate acts under civil RICO.
Generic companies routinely challenge issued
pharmaceutical patents via ANDA Paragraph IV applications,
which may also qualify as a predicate act under civil RICO. Under
the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug manufacturer can
challenge an approved brand name drug's listed patents as invalid
or not infringed when applying for an ANDA.10 6 Courts have held
99 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 204 F.3d at 1380. The reason the Federal
Circuit held that inequitable conduct before the PTO cannot qualify as mail or
wire fraud under RICO was because "an application that has not yet matured
into a patent cannot properly be deemed government property." Id.; see supra
Part III.C.
100 35 U.S.C. § 291.
101 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F.
Supp. 1053 (D. Md. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130 (4th Cir. 1993).
12 35 U.S.C. § 135(b). Under certain circumstances, the challenger must initiate
the proceedings within one year after publication. §§ 122(b), 135(b)(2).
103 § 135(a); see also § 102(g).
104 § 135(c).
105 See Precision Instrument Mfr. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945) (finding fraud during the interference proceeding).
106 § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
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that the right to the resulting ANDA itself, as an unissued license,
is not property for the purposes of mail fraud. 10 7 However, the
individual right to a license is different from attacking another
issued patent. Therefore, fraudulent Paragraph IV filings aimed at
depriving the patentee of his vested property right may be a
predicate act under civil RICO, regardless of the resulting
license.
108
Other areas of patent prosecution involve post-grant filing
but probably do not qualify for civil RICO, like reissue or
reexamination proceedings. Reissue proceedings are open to the
public to allow third parties to submit evidence and arguments
relating to the patentability of the patent application.10 9 However,
to initiate a reissue proceeding, the patentee must surrender and
abandon his prior application. The reissued patent is then given a
completely different patent number. Therefore, any third party
submissions during a reissue are most likely to be viewed as pre-
grant filing, not a post-grant filing, because the reissue is alin to a
new application.110 Similarly, reexamination proceedings allow
any third party to challenge the validity of the issued patent, either
ex parte or inter partes. H] However, reexaminations are limited to
submitting other patents or printed publications. 12  The limited
scope of review in reexamination suggests a lower possibility for
fraud because the PTO is better able to evaluate and to assess
patents or printed publications. Therefore, although reissue and
reexamination occur post-grant, filings during these proceedings
are likely not to qualify as predicate acts under Civil RICO.
Congress has recently contemplated patent reform,
including post-grant procedures. One of the major reforms under
107 See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1071-73 (D. Md.
1991), aff'dsub nom. Mylan Labs., Inc. v., Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993);
see also Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (comparing ANDA licenses with pre-issuance patent
applications).
108 See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 204 F.3d at 1379 ("[U]nder federal
patent law and Supreme Court precedent, an issued patent constitutes property.")
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 261; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
415 (1945)).
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 251; § 301 ("Any person at any time may cite to the Office
in writing prior art consisting of patents or printed publications which that
person believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular
patent.").
110 However, a reissue does retain the original filing date.




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 11 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol11/iss1/2
CONTROLLING PATENT TROLLING WITH CIVIL RICO
consideration is a post-grant opposition process.' 3  Post-grant
oppositions would allow third party submissions to challenge or
effectively cancel issued patents. Should this reform take place,
would-be trolls could attack newly issued patents with fraudulent
filings.1 14 By definition, a post-grant procedure occurs after the
issuance of a patent. The opposition proceeding does not have the
limited review of reexamination nor does it require surrendering
the patent like reissue. Therefore, civil RICO most likely still
applies, and any fraudulent filings with the PTO could still be
viewed as a deprivation of property and qualify as a proper
predicate act of mail or wire fraud.
Challenging a patent under civil RICO can run afoul of
civil RICO in a few distinct areas. During post-grant interferences
and ANDA Paragraph IV filings, a would-be challenger exposes
himself to qualifying predicate acts under civil RICO. However,
the peculiarities of reissue and reexamination - abandonment and
limited review, respectively - limit the applicability of civil RICO
to those contexts. Finally, modern patent reform may introduce
new avenues for abuse, namely post-grant oppositions.
C. Civil RICO and Brand Name Pharmaceuticals
Broad application of RICO to aggressive litigation of
patents may have some unintended consequences and benefits. In
particular, the recognition of civil RICO as it applies to patent
litigation may disproportionately affect brand name pharmaceutical
companies. Brand name pharmaceutical companies spend millions
on research and development of their products. Generic
manufacturers frequently attempt to circumvent or challenge any
patents the brand name companies obtain. The brand name
companies, having large interests in maintaining their monopoly
rights on patented drugs, bring suit for patent infringement against
all generic infringers. The resulting patents are usually challenged
by generic manufacturers during either the infringement litigation
or ANDA Paragraph IV challenges through allegations of
inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct arises so frequently that
the Federal Circuit has even published opinions openly criticizing
the over-use. 5 Many of the brand name companies' patents are
113 This reform is considered to lower the cost in comparison to outright
litigation, but will most likely open the door to more validity questions.
Christopher L. Logan, Patent Reform 2005: HR 2795 and the Road to Post-
Grant Oppositions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 975, 994 (2006).
114 Post-grant opposition could also be viewed as harming small inventors by
allowing large corporations the ability to attack solo inventor's patents. See id.
115 The habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every
major patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable
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then found to be unenforceable because of the patentee's
inequitable conduct. This pattern of repetitive, extensive litigation
against an industry, the generic manufacturers, and common
findings of inequitable conduct suggest that major brand name
pharmaceutical companies, much like Lemelson, risk exposure to
civil RICO violations.
Although brand name pharmaceutical companies are not
technically patent trolls because the companies practice their
inventions, liability under civil RICO is still appropriate. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the "public [has] a
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from
backgrounds free from .. .inequitable conduct and that such
monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope." '116  The
common inequitable conduct rulings against pharmaceutical
companies suggest that the ordinary deterrents toward fraudulent
conduct with the PTO are not working. By attaching civil RICO
violations on top of the threat of inequitable conduct, the major
brand name pharmaceutical companies would have a stronger
interest in perfecting patent monopolies free from inequitable
conduct. The judicial system will benefit by relying on the
strength and clarity of well-prosecuted patents. A presumptively
valid patent, prosecuted honestly, should reduce the ability of
claimants to allege invalidity. Therefore, although applying civil
RICO to litigious behavior to target patent trolls could affect
innovative brand name pharmaceutical companies
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against
other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent
their client's interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere
with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but
such charges are not inconsequential on that account. They
destroy the respect for one another's integrity, for being fellow
members of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar
a valuable help to the courts in making a sound disposition of
their cases, and to sustain the good name of the bar itself. A
patent litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an
unsupported charge of "inequitable conduct in the Patent
Office" is a negative contribution to the rightful administration
of justice. The charge was formerly known as "fraud on the
Patent Office," a more pejorative term, but the change of name
does not make the thing itself smell any sweeter. Even after
complete testimony the court should find inequitable conduct
only if shown by clear and convincing evidence. A summary
judgment that a reputable attorney has been guilty of
inequitable conduct, over his denials, ought to be, and can
properly be, rare indeed.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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disproportionately, civil RICO would serve the greater public
purpose of encouraging stronger patenting in lieu of extensive
litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern patent system is incapable of policing
extensive fraud. This inability to control fraudulent activity has
created a system susceptible for abuse. The current remedies
offered by the courts to counterbalance fraudulent conduct and
trolling have not proved a sufficient disincentive to curb this
behavior. Specifically, the remedies for fraud have not proven
capable of deterring repetitive abusers.
Other areas of law outside patent law have tried to curb
repetitive abuse, especially under antitrust. Walker Process
opened up violators to the treble damages under the Sherman Act.
However, Walker Process proved so unworkable as to be almost
dead letter. Other attempts to control abusive behavior under the
patent laws using antitrust have been attempted such as the
questionably legal reverse payment settlement where the plaintiff
patentee pays the alleged infringer to stay out of the market, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine's sham litigation exception, and the
patent misuse doctrine. All of these have proven ineffective or
unworkable. Simply, there is no effective deterrent to extensive
fraud and abuse.
Civil RICO may be that solution. The incentive for using
civil RICO is too high to permit its use as a common counterclaim,
and the limitations on civil RICO, like the number of victims and
the length of activity, help keep civil RICO from overtaking
ordinary fraud. While civil RICO should not apply to where the
Patent Office's standard remedies of unenforceability for
inequitable conduct compensate for individual instances of fraud,
civil RICO can be used to limit repeated abuses of the system
where these ordinary penalties do not work. Fraud that extends
beyond just filing to include Lemelson litigation schemes, should
be recognized to lead to civil liability under RICO.
Recognizing civil RICO in the patent context may
disproportionately affect brand name pharmaceutical companies.
Any concerns of the cost to brand name manufacturers are
overwhelmingly counterbalanced by the incentive for companies to
seek the strongest patents possible. The immediate cost to the
brand name companies may be high, but the overall public good
demands patents with integrity. The public benefits by confidence
in the fortitude of its patents. The judicial system benefits when
patents stand firm against invalidity. Civil RICO will promote
honesty and fair dealing throughout the patent process, from when
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the brand name companies acquire their patent through when they
litigate their patents.
The modern abuses of the patent system need to be
addressed. Congress is attempting to remedy these problems in
modern patent reform. However, effective, pre-existing law
should not be ignored. As the courts have previously attempted to
control patent abuse using the antitrust laws, courts should not
overlook the ability of civil RICO to apply in patent litigations.
Although violations may be rare and should only be found for
extreme abuses, the result could be a reduction in extensive fraud
on the Patent Office, a reduction in the misuse of the court
systems, and a higher quality of issued patents. Patent holding
companies may then think twice about using such dubious tactics
in acquisition, challenging existing patentees, and enforcement.
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